Voluntary pension savings and tax incentives: Evidence from Finland by Harju, Jarkko
Government
Institute for
Economic Research
Jarkko Harju Working Papers 33 June 2012
Working
Papers 33
Voluntary pension savings and tax incentives: 
Evidence from Finland
VATT WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
Voluntary pension 
savings and tax 
incentives:  
Evidence from Finland 
 
Jarkko Harju 
 
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus 
Government Institute for Economic Research 
Helsinki 2012 
Jarkko Harju, VATT, Arkadiankatu 7, PL 1279, 00101 Helsinki, Suomi Finland, 
jarkko.harju@vatt.fi, +358403045507 
I would like to thank Seppo Kari, Leena Kerkelä, Tuomas Kosonen, Tomi Kyyrä, 
Teemu Lyytikäinen, Jukka Pirttilä, Timo Silvola, Päivi Valdes, Takis Venetoklis, 
Heikki Viitamäki, Matti Virén and the participants in various seminars for their 
useful comments. I would also like to thank the Federation of Finnish Financial 
Services, the Nordic Tax Research Council, the Alfred Kordelin Foundation, the 
Finnish Cultural Foundation and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation for their financial 
support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-952-274-026-7 (nid.) 
ISBN 978-952-274-027-4 (PDF) 
 
ISSN 1798-0283 (nid.) 
ISSN 1798-0291 (PDF) 
 
 
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus 
Government Institute for Economic Research 
Arkadiankatu 7, 00100 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Edita Prima Oy 
Helsinki, June 2012 
Cover design: Niilas Nordenswan  
Voluntary pension savings and tax incentives: Evidence 
from Finland  
 
Government Institute for Economic Research 
VATT Working Papers 33/2012  
 
Jarkko Harju 
 
Abstract  
This paper studies empirically savers’ behavioral responses to the Finnish tax 
reform of 2005 by using comprehensive panel data. The tax schedule of 
voluntary pension savings changed from progressive to proportional, changing 
the saving incentives in different subgroups. The results indicate that the reform 
altered saving behavior by reducing voluntary pension saving coverage among 
high income-earners by 4 percentage points and increasing it among low income-
earners by 2 percentage points. The reform also reduced annual saving 
contributions among high income-earners by over 20 percent. The estimated 
effects result entirely from the changed saving behavior of men. 
Key words: Voluntary pension savings, tax reform, tax incentives 
JEL classification numbers: H24, H31 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Vapaaehtoisten eläkevakuutusten verotus muuttui vuonna 2005 Suomessa, kun 
verotusperusteet siirtyivät ansiotuloverojärjestelmästä pääomatulovero-
järjestelmään. Verouudistus muutti säästämiskannustimia eri ansiotuloryhmissä. 
Tämä tutkimus arvioi uudistuksen aiheuttamia käyttäytymisvaikutuksia 
empiirisesti. Tulosten perusteella säästämisaktiivisuus laski suurituloisten 
keskuudessa keskimäärin 4 prosenttiyksiköllä ja nousi 2 prosenttiyksiköllä 
pienituloisten keskuudessa. Lisäksi suurituloisten keskimääräiset säästöt 
eläkevakuutustileille pienenivät noin 20 prosenttia. Arvioidut tulokset johtuvat 
ainoastaan miesten muuttuneesta käyttäytymisestä. 
Asiasanat: Vapaaehtoiset eläkevakuutukset, verouudistus, verokannustimet 
JEL-luokittelu: H24, H31 
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1. Introduction1 
Many western countries face increasing difficulties in financing their current 
social security programs due to the decreasing proportion of the working-age 
population. In response they have been cutting the future scope of their public 
pay-as-you-go pension systems. In order to guarantee an adequate level of old-
age income, they have tried to encourage individual pension savings by granting 
tax-allowances. Well known examples of tax-favored individual pension savings 
plans are the IRAs and 401(k) plans in the USA, Personal and Stakeholder 
pensions, and ISAs and TESSAs in the UK and Riester pensions in Germany. 
Most OECD countries provide special tax treatment for some sort of individual 
saving plans (OECD 2005). A common system is EET (exempt-exempt-tax) 
which allows the saving to be deductible from the income tax base, the earnings 
of pension accumulations are tax-free, and the pensions, when withdrawn, are 
taxable income. Another widely used system is TEE (tax-exempt-exempt) where 
contributions are taxed but accrued interest and benefits are untaxed.  
The most common motivation for tax-deferred voluntary pension plans is to 
increase the aggregate saving rate and secure the income of retired persons.2 The 
paternalistic argument in favor of preferential tax treatment is that savers are 
myopic and they start to provide for pension savings too late. Some economists 
also argue that the illiquidity of pension savings makes their elasticity differ from 
that of precautionary savings. This would justify preferential tax treatment for 
pension savings (Fehr et al. 2008, p. 193). In the recent Mirrlees review, Banks 
and Diamond (2010) discuss why tax-favored pension savings are important. 
Their most fundamental argument for tax-favored treatment is the huge 
heterogeneity in people’s saving behavior: some save too much and some do not 
save enough. They also argue that other methods should be thought of than just 
exemptions from tax bases. For example, it would be possible to increase the role 
of employers or financial institutions in the private pension saving markets.  
However, there are some counter-arguments too. Only a small part of the 
increased pension contributions are new savings. Most is actually transfers from 
other savings instruments to tax-preferred instruments.3 In addition, many front-
                                              
1 List of abbreviations in the order of appearance in the paper: IRA, Individual Retirement Arrangement; 
ISA, Individual Savings Account; TESSA, Tax-Exempt Special Savings Account; EET, Exempt Exempt 
Taxable; TEE, Taxable Exempt Exempt; TR2005, Finnish Tax Reform on voluntary pension savings in 
2005; VPP, Voluntary Pension Plan; TyEL, earnings-related pension; GDP, Gross Domestic Product; 
DIT, Dual Income Tax; METR, Marginal Effective Tax Rate; MTR, Marginal Tax Rate; OLS, Ordinary 
Least Squares. 
2 Bernheim (2002) presents a comprehensive analysis concerning taxation and savings. 
3 General equilibrium models are used to estimate the effects of voluntary pension plan savings on the 
capital stock and incremental savings. Imrohoroglu et al. (1998) have concluded that there are increases in 
national net savings, capital stock and additional savings but the effects are not extensive. Fehr et al. 
(2008) estimated the additional savings to be 22% higher than in the Imrohoroglu et al. paper (1998) 
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loaded voluntary pension plan instruments are problematic in countries where 
certain subpopulations can get larger tax advantages than others. This is 
especially true if the deductions are made based on progressive taxation.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically how the Finnish tax reform of 
2005 (TR2005) affected the behavior of voluntary pension plan (VPP) savers in 
Finland. The main objective is to examine whether or not the coverage and/or the 
amount of savings in VPPs changed. Before the reform, savings were deducted 
from labor income and the benefits were taxed as labor income, subject to a 
steeply progressive tax rate schedule4. TR2005 changed the tax treatment to a 
flat-rate capital income taxation regime. The previous tax schedule was seen as 
being problematic as the individuals faced different saving incentives depending 
on their taxable income.5 The most drastic incentive change was among high 
income earners who were close to retirement age. Among young and middle 
income individuals the change in the incentives was very moderate, if any. Due 
to this variation, the reform seems to open up an interesting opportunity to 
estimate the effects of the tax change on different income groups.  
This paper applies the TR2005 as a natural experiment using a difference-in-
difference method. In the analysis, the control group is formulated for middle 
income individuals, who are compared to high and low income individuals who 
faced the largest changes in their saving incentives.  
The questions examined by Attanasio et al. (2005), Chung et al. (2008) and 
Disney et al. (2010) are closest to that of this paper. Attanasio et al. (2005) 
studied the effect of tax deductions on saving behavior in the UK. They 
examined the tax reform of 1999 and found that the amount of tax-exempted 
savings increased in all age groups due to the reform. Particularly young people 
saved more. However, at the same time, the amount of aggregate savings 
decreased in all age groups and the largest decreases were among the young and 
low-income groups. Chung et al. (2008) and Disney et al. (2010) studied the UK 
tax reform of 2001. Chung et al. did not find any significant growth in new 
private savings after the reform. However, in the case of low labor incomes the 
amount of savings increased. Another focus in their study was the changes in the 
coverage of having a retirement plan before and after the reform. There was no 
evidence indicating any increase in the coverage. Disney et al. argued that the 
associated change in the contribution ceiling benefited low and zero-earners; this 
group added the coverage of savings in voluntary pension accounts. The results 
also provided evidence that women added coverage. In contrast to the rest of the 
                                              
4 Finnish income taxation follows the Nordic dual income tax system in which labor income is subject to 
a progressive tax schedule whereas capital income is taxed using a flat tax rate. (See Sørensen 1994, 
2005) 
5 Kari and Lyytikäinen (2004) and Määttänen (2005) have drawn attention to this incentive aspect of 
TR2005. 
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sample, the level of contributions among those who benefiting from the higher 
contribution limit did not fall.6 
According to my results, it seems obvious that TR2005 affected the VPP saving 
behavior of individuals. The coverage of high income earners decreased after the 
reform by 4 percentage points and contributions went down by 20 percent 
compared to middle income earners. Low income earners increased their 
participation rate by 2 percentage points but their level of savings did not change. 
These results seem to be consistent with the theoretical results. In addition, it 
seems that all of the responses were due to a change in men’s behavior. Thus, 
women did not change their behavior at all. However, much of the responses 
could come from individuals’ reallocation of savings and not from the changes in 
total savings, as many previous studies have indicated. Unfortunately, due to the 
lack of micro data on total savings, this study cannot answer how aggregate 
savings were affected by the reform. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the second chapter, I present a short 
introduction to the Finnish VPP savings scheme and the tax system related to it, 
and I will also describe the model for assessing the effective tax rate for savers 
before and after TR2005. The third chapter contains empirical analysis where I 
introduce the hypotheses and explain the econometric method used, in addition to 
which I present the data set and offer the estimates of the responses to TR2005. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter I present my conclusions. 
                                              
6 There is also a comprehensive previous literature about the effects of tax-deductible savings on 
aggregate savings in the US (see e.g. Engen et al. (1994), Venti and Wise (1992, 1995), Attanasio and 
DeLeire (2002), Benjamin (2003), Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004).  
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2. Voluntary pension plans in Finland 
In the international literature it is common to describe pension systems in terms 
of three ‘pillars’. In Finland the pension system7 is based on a public first pillar 
which is divided into two parts. First, the national pension is the basic tier which 
is a flat-rate benefit, financed through taxes and contributions. The second part is 
the earnings-related pension (TyEL), which is financed from compulsory 
contributions paid by employees and employers8. The second pillar complements 
the first pillar and includes voluntary collective industry-specific or employer-
specific schemes. The third pillar comprises voluntary pension plans (VPP).  
The public pension provision is comprehensive in Finland, representing over 10 
per cent of GDP. This share is expected to grow in the future. Total pension 
expenditure consists approximately of 95 percent statutory pensions and 5 
percent VPPs. However, VPP savings have gradually grown in popularity in 
recent decades, but these instruments still have only a minor role compared to the 
other saving options.  
Figure 1 depicts the increase in the coverage and in the amount of yearly VPP 
contributions from 1995 to 2007. The data set is from Statistics Finland. It is a 
representative sample of Finnish people, including approximately 28,000 
individuals per year. By weighting the data to represent the whole population of 
Finland, we can calculate the sum of VPPs and the number of savers per year. 
The sum of savings is in millions of euro and at 1995 prices. The grey pillars are 
the sum of deductions per year (left vertical axis) and the thick line shows the 
number of savers (right vertical axis).  
The number of savers has increased considerably. Growth was stable until 2001 
but thereafter the number of savers exceeded the average trend growth. In 2004 
and 2006 there was just a small increase, which might be explained by the overall 
uncertainty regarding the new tax system. However, the number of pension 
savers rose by almost 50,000 savers from 2004 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2007. 
 
 
                                              
7 The Finnish Centre for Pensions (Handbook 2007:6) offers a comprehensive description of the Finnish 
pension system. 
8 In 2005 there were reforms in earnings-related pensions. The main changes in the reform were that 
earnings over persons’ entire working career were taken into account, a flexible retirement age between 
63 and 68 was introduced, higher accumulation rates for older workers were applied, and increased life 
expectancy started to matter for pensions with being lowered as life expectancy increases. At the same 
time there was a wide debate about the sustainability of the public pension system. 
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Figure 1 The sum of VPPs and the number of savers from 1995 to 2007 
(Source: Income Distribution data 1995–2007 (Statistics 
Finland)) 
 
 
The sum of savings has increased over the last decade. The annual growth in 
savings has been fairly linear, except for 2001 and after the reform, in 2005 
onwards. The poor economic cycle could also have affected the subnormal 
growth in savings in 2001. However, savings growth picked up from 2001 to 
2005. In 2006 the aggregate amount of savings dropped approximately to the 
2003 level and seemed to stay there in 2007 too. One explanation is that the 
decline in the sum of savings is simply reallocation of savings from VPPs to 
other types of saving options, leaving aggregate savings unaffected. 
Unfortunately, due to the data limitations it is not possible to evaluate the 
changes in aggregate savings caused by TR2005. 
2.1 Tax scheme for VPPs 
A notable feature of the Finnish income tax system is the Nordic-type dual 
income tax (DIT) which combines a steeply progressive taxation of labor income 
and a flat-rate taxation of capital income. Interestingly, although this has received 
little attention in tax literature, the DIT system offers two alternative ways to tax 
private pension savings in EET system. The first way is to apply a progressive 
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taxation on both contributions and withdrawals. The differences in tax rates will 
have different implications for saving incentives.  
Tax literature has paid some attention to progressive taxation applying an EET 
model (OECD 1994, 2005) which is the model applied to VPPs in Finland. 
According to the literature, a progressive tax scheme can lead to a wide variation 
of incentives between different contributors and may end up favoring savers in 
high income classes. A solution to these heterogeneous incentives under DIT 
could be to tax VPPs with flat rates of tax on capital income.  
Tax reform of 2005 
The Finnish law on VPPs was based on labor income taxation until 2004. 
Deductions were made from labor income and tax on withdrawals was paid as on 
labor income. After the reform deductions are made from capital income and 
withdrawals from these savings are taxed according to the flat tax rate on capital 
income (Ministry of Finance (2005)). VPP contributions are deducted from 
capital income after natural deductions9, interests and losses. If the total amount 
of contributions is higher than the total amount of capital income, the taxpayer is 
entitled to deduct the deficit from the labor income taxes. 
Before the reform, deductions were applicable if the saver had undertaken to 
keep his/her savings in the plan until the age of 60. This contractual limit was 
also increased to 62 years after 2005. In addition, the maximum deductable 
amount decreased considerably from 8,500 to 5,000 euro under to the reform.10   
Transitional rules 
The new law came into force at the beginning of 2005. However, it included the 
following transitional regulations. Firstly, in 2005 it was still possible to apply 
the old rules to contracts concluded before the government’s first proposal (6 
May 2004). Secondly, the tax rules on pension plans included transitional 
provisions for savers entering into a contract between the government’s first 
reform proposal and the end of 2004. Savers making their first contributions in 
that period deducted their contributions from labor income and their future 
withdrawals will be taxed on the basis of capital taxation. This means that 
persons with high marginal labor income tax rates had a major incentive to save 
in pension plans in 2004. Thirdly, the contractual age remained at 60 years (or 
lower, depending on which age limit was valid when the contract was made) 
until 2009 if the contract with the insurance company was made before the first 
                                              
9 According to Finnish tax law, natural deduction refers to a taxpayer’s right to deduct from investment 
income all expenses incurred in acquiring and maintaining such income (Ministry of Finance, 2005). 
10 The Finnish government reformed the VPP system again from the beginning of 2010 by introducing a 
new pension saving instrument. It was aimed to increase competition and lower the saving expenses of 
savers. Only insurance companies were allowed to provide pension savings plans until the end of 2009, 
but after 2010, for instance, all banks were allowed to offer VPPs. 
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government proposal. As from 2006, all deductions have been made from capital 
income and withdrawals are taxed at the capital tax rate. 
2.2 Measuring tax incentives of VPP savings 
A common way to compare tax incentives to save in a particular instrument is to 
calculate the marginal effective tax rate (METR), as was the case in the OECD 
(1994) report. The METR illustrates the tax burden of an investment option 
better than the nominal tax rate because it allows one to take into account many 
other factors which interact with taxes (OECD 1994, p. 62). For example, 
inflation, tax base regulations and overlapping taxes can be included in the 
formula of the METR.  
Kari and Lyytikäinen (2004) introduced a simple way to measure the tax burden 
of different private investments in Finland and applied also the METR approach 
to VPPs in the EET system. The method of Kari and Lyytikäinen is simpler than 
the OECD (1994) version, and under their approach the METR can be presented 
in just one formula.11 The pattern of the METR is based on12 
ܯܧܴܶ ൌ ଵ௥் ݈݊ ቀ
ଵିఛ೟
ଵିఛ೟శభቁ    (1) 
 
where r is the real interest rate, T is the saving period, ߬௧ is the marginal tax rate 
(MTR) for income from which deductions are made and ߬௧ାଵ is the MTR for 
pensions. 
The model relies on the following assumptions. The contribution is one euro out 
of the saver’s disposal income in a private pension plan at time t=0. The holding 
period is T years and the withdrawal is made in the form of a lump sum. The real 
interest rate r is fixed and positive. The model assumes perfect competition in the 
insurance market and that there are no management or other expenses. 
The lower the METR, the better it is for the saver. The expression (1) is negative 
if ሺ1 െ ߬௧ሻ/ሺ1 െ ߬௧ାଵሻ is between zero and one, and positive if  
ሺ1 െ ߬௧ሻ/ሺ1 െ ߬௧ାଵሻ is larger than one. The saving incentive is affected by two 
different factors when the interest rate is fixed: first, the difference between 
MTRs on contribution and withdrawal periods and, second, the holding period of 
the savings. If the MTR is higher for the contribution period (߬௧) than for the 
withdrawal period (߬௧ାଵ), the tax authorities do not collect all the tax deductions 
back as tax income. In a progressive tax scheme it is likely that some savers 
could benefit from this. Therefore, some savers could have a substantial tax 
incentive by saving in VPPs, especially those in the highest tax brackets. Hence 
                                              
11 Wakefield (2009) also used a similar method to calculate effective tax rates for different assets under 
the UK tax system. 
12 The notation is slightly different from Kari and Lyytikäinen (2004).  
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Secondly, the length of the holding period of savings (T) affects the extent of the 
incentives. The METR on retirement savings approaches zero in the holding 
horizon, as Kari and Lyytikäinen point out. Before the reform the effective tax 
rate could have been very low for short holding periods (T), for example the 
METR can be as low as -150% if the holding period is only 3 years but it 
increases to -15% if the holding period is 20 years and further increases to over -
10% when the holding period is over 30 years. Therefore, it is clear that holding 
period affects the METR but still does not eliminate the incentives totally. In the 
new system, where the flat tax rate is applied, the effective tax rate is zero and 
the incentives are equal between different savers. 
Kari and Lyytikäinen (2004) illustrate in more detail the effect of the reform by 
simulating METRs at different fixed labor income levels (Figure 2)13. The figure 
illustrates that persons with low annual labor income (20,000 €) and low annual 
pension income (below 15,000 €) had very high positive METRs. Therefore, it 
was not very profitable for them to invest in the pension plans. Persons with 
higher annual labor income (40,000 € and 60,000 €) could benefit from below-
zero METRs. For example, if the annual pension level is half of annual wages, 
the METRs for wages of 20,000 €, 40,000 € and 60,000 € are 28%, -20% and -
54%. After the reform, in the capital taxation model, the METR equals zero and 
thus the incentives are the same independent of their income levels. 
As TR2005 considerably changed saving incentives for VPPs depending on 
individuals’ wage levels, how individuals reacted to these changes is an 
empirical question. The natural way to study the effects of the reform is to 
evaluate the changes in contributions and the rate of participation of different 
subgroups. To summarize, due to the changes in tax incentives, the empirical 
analysis is based on the following predictions that we observe 
• a decrease in VPP savings and participation among high labor income 
individuals and especially those close to the retirement age, and; 
• an increase in VPP savings and participation among low labor income and 
young individuals. 
 
                                              
13 In their analysis they applied the TUJA micro simulation model which is in use at VATT (Government 
Institute for Economic Research). The calculations are made assuming a 4% interest rate and a 10-year 
investment horizon. 
 9 
 
Figure 2 The marginal effective tax rates on pension savings for different 
labor and pension income (the interest rate is assumed to be 4% 
and the saving period is 10 years) 
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3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Methods 
The following empirical strategy is based on the assumption that the reform of 
2005 was exogenous for individuals and that incentives changed differently in 
different subgroups. Thus, it provides an opportunity to estimate the effects of 
the reform on the saving coverage and the amount of savings by using a 
difference-in-difference strategy. This method requires individuals to be divided 
to those who were affected by the reform (treatment) and to those who were not 
affected (control). 
The difference-in-difference model can be written as follows 
tiitiiiti XDTreatTreatP ,,, εηβγδα +++++= , (3) 
where ,i tP  is an outcome variable that is the annual ( t ) amount of VPP savings as 
a logarithm per individual i  or a dummy variable with a value of one if the 
individual saves in a VPP and zero otherwise.  Treat is a treatment status 
equaling zero for the control group and one for the treatment group, D represents 
an indicator of the post-reform period and X  is a vector of control variables. In 
most cases the estimation strategy is a fixed-effect method in which the 
parameter iη  can be separated from the error term. The vector of control 
variables includes individuals’ age, capital income, debt, labor income and tax 
payments when the fixed-effect model is used. In the case of the random effect or 
probit model, the control vector also includes other characteristics like marital 
status, place of residence, type of residence and socioeconomic status. In 
addition, all the specifications include year dummies for controlling the time 
trend and a flexible linear time trend for the treatment group. 
Ideally, a difference-in-difference method would be used if the treatment and 
control groups could be selected randomly. However, the 2005 reform in Finland 
does not offer a random division into treatment and control groups. Thus, it is 
necessary to use a natural experimental approach and formulate the control and 
treatment groups carefully. The natural starting point is to consider the MTRs on 
pension and wages, as showed in the theoretical section. Individuals are aware of 
the MTR on their wages but not the MTR on pensions. To be able to use equation 
(1) in formulating the hypotheses, we need to assume that individuals expect the 
MTR on pensions to follow the current tax code for pensions. This is a sensible 
assumption since there is no clear reason why individuals would have any better 
information about the future tax scheme than the current tax schedule. Especially 
individuals with continuous work biographies generally fulfill this assumption; 
however, for workers with a fragmented work history this would not necessarily 
 11 
 
hold very well. Thus, after the main econometric results in Section 4, I perform a 
battery of robustness checks to show that the main results are not affected by the 
formulation of the control and treatment groups. 
As stated in the Section 2.2, the incentives to invest in VPPs depend on the 
MTRs on wages and pensions. Figure 3 presents the MTRs both on annual 
pensions and wages in 2003 to point out the incentive differences depend on 
income levels.14 There are at least four important aspects in Figure 3. First, the 
MTRs are much higher for pensions between 7,500 and 16,000 euro than for 
wages, which is a result of differences in deductions between wages and 
pensions. Second, for the highest wage bracket the MTR is always higher than 
the MTRs on pensions if the pension income is lower than 55,000 euro (pensions 
higher than 55,000 euro are very rare in Finland). Therefore, individuals in this 
tax bracket had clear incentive to save in VPPs before the reform. Third, 
individuals in the second-highest wage bracket (wages between 33,000 and 
58,000 euro) did not have such a clear incentive to save in VPPs, assuming that 
their pension income will not be below 7,500 euro (which is a very low annual 
pension level in Finland). Fourth, individuals in the wage band from 7,500 to 
22,000 euro faced higher a MTR on pensions than on wages and therefore had a 
positive METR, implying no clear incentive to save in VPPs (again, assuming 
that their pension income will not be below 7,500 euro). 
Both the control and treatment groups are formulated based on the tax schedule 
for wages and pensions presented in Figure 3. Using the marginal tax rate 
schedule for 2003, the highest bracket in the tax schedule constitutes a first 
treatment group (taxable labor income higher than 58,000 euro in 2003)15. The 
subgroup which saw an increase in incentives to save due to the reform is low 
income earners. Following the reform their positive METR went to zero.16 
Therefore, a second treatment group is for low earners which had taxable labor 
income between 7,500 and 22,000 euro in 2003. The second highest tax bracket 
acts as a control group (taxable labor income from 33,000 to 58,000 euro) and is 
not assumed to experience any change in incentives.  
The main assumption of the difference-in-difference method is the parallel time 
trends between the control and treatment groups before the policy change. Thus, 
the time effects must be common for the control and treatment groups. In 
addition, the composition of the treatment and control groups must remain stable 
over time. If these assumptions hold, the model identifies the coefficient γ  in 
equation (3), which is the average treatment effect on treated individuals.  
                                              
14 To be clear, wages refer here to the total sum of annual taxable labor income and pensions are the total 
sum of annual pensions taxed as labor income. 
15 The information for 2002 is used similarly in the robustness checks. 
16 If we assume that after the reform the capital tax rate is the same in the contribution and withdrawal 
period. However, this is not a huge assumption, at least in the sense of savers’ expectations.  
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Figure 3 Marginal tax rates on pensions and wages in Finland in 2003 
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One additional point to be taken into account is that the provision allowed 
existing savers to use the former system until the end of 2005. People could 
choose to make contributions up to the upper limit and gain the tax benefits. It 
was also possible to deduct contributions from labor income in 2004 and pay 
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capital tax if the contract between the saver and the insurance company was 
signed between 6 May 2004 and the end of 2004; in other words, it was possible 
to receive an extra tax benefit in these years. These special provisions created a 
clear incentive to anticipate the reform. Thus, to make sure that this does not bias 
the estimates, the estimations are also performed without the years 2004 and 
2005. Then years 2000-2003 represent the before period and 2006 and 2007 the 
after period. Otherwise the years from 2000 to 2004 are used as the before period 
and the years from 2005 to 2007 as the after period. 
3.2. Data 
The data set is from Statistics Finland. It is a panel-stratified sample of 
approximately 53,000 annual observations. The data set is a representative 
sample of the Finnish population and covers the period from 2000 to 2007. The 
analysis is made by examining two outcome variables: the coverage of savers 
(participation) and the amount of VPP contributions deducted from the income 
tax bases as a logarithm (labor and capital). The data set contains many other 
relevant continuous variables including labor income, capital income and age, 
which are used as control variables. There are also many important dummy 
variables like gender, place of residence, marital and socioeconomic status. 
Unfortunately, the data has no variable representing the private wealth of a 
person, thus it is impossible to analyze the changes in total wealth of individuals 
because of the reform. 
The descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the estimations are given 
in Table 1 below. These descriptive statistics are calculated for the subsample 
which includes only the control and the two treatment groups described above.17 
All the euro values are given in current prices for each year. VPP savings 
represents annual savings in the accounts. In the control group the mean VPP 
savings are over 300 euro but in the high treatment group the mean is over 900 
euro. VPP savings coverage is also much higher in the high treatment groups. In 
the low treatment group the mean savings amount in VPPs is below 80 euro and 
8 per cent of population save.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
17 The descriptive statistics for the whole data set are presented in the Appendix, Table 1. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics by groups, data from 2000 to 2007  
Variables Control Treatment - high Treatment - low 
VPP savings coverage 0.1726 0.2589 0.0784 
 0.3779 0.4381 0.2687 
VPP savings 326.4 921.5 79.5 
 1052.5 2102.2 463.4 
Labor income 39284.3 72519.8 15233.7 
 11641.6 45360.6 6953.3 
Debts 25893.1 35268.0 11053.3 
 40196.3 64909.6 22768.0 
Capital income 2860.9 10460.8 928.1 
 35222.8 58348.3 7686.4 
Home ownership 0.7307 0.8293 0.4057 
 0.4436 0.3763 0.4910 
Taxes paid 14274.9 33955.9 3594.1 
 11587.4 31058.5 3397.4 
Male 0.7483 0.8532 0.4194 
 0.4340 0.3539 0.4935 
Age 47.9 49.8 50.5 
 11.5 9.9 17.5 
Number of observations 28727 6608 175917 
Note: Table contains mean (uneven rows) and standard deviation (even rows) values of 
variables categorized by control and treatment status. 
 
3.3. Descriptive analysis of the treatment and control groups 
Figure 4 shows the coverage of VPP savers in two separate treatment groups and 
in the control group. The low-income treatment group increased its coverage over 
the whole examination period. The increase is almost linear, starting from under 
5 per cent in 2000 and culminating at approximately 13 per cent in 2007. The 
high-income treatment group increased its coverage from 2000 to 2004, but after 
that the share decreased. The coverage in the control group increased from 2000 
until 2003 but thereafter the share is relatively constant. The coverage of pension 
savers in the high-income treatment group seems to be similar to the control 
group before the reform, which is essential to the analysis, since the difference-
in-difference model assumes common trends between groups. The pre-reform 
trends also seem to be relatively similar in both the low-income treatment group 
and the control group, although coverage increased a bit faster in the control 
group. Figure 4 provides descriptive support for our hypotheses: individuals in 
the high labor income treatment group lowered their participation rate and those 
in the low labor income treatment group increased their participation rate. 
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Figure 4 Participation rate and 95% confidence intervals in the treatment 
and control groups from 2000 to 2007 
 
 
Figure 5 represents the mean of annual VPP savings in the treatment and control 
groups for those who saved in VPP accounts. Thus all those who did not save are 
excluded from this descriptive analysis. There seems to be a downward trend in 
mean payments after the reform. In all groups the mean amount of VPP savings 
decreased clearly from 2005 onwards. The mean savings amount in the high 
labor income treatment group declined much more than in the control group after 
the reform. The mean in the high labor income treatment group is 2,500 euro 
after the reform, whereas before it was approximately 4,000 euro. On the other 
hand, it seems that the mean savings amount in the low income treatment group 
did not change much after the reform compared to the pre-reform years.  
All in all, the descriptive analysis indicates that the trends in the mean savings 
amount are similar between groups before the reform, and the main assumption 
of common time trends between groups, identifying the effect of the reform, 
seems to be reasonable. In addition, it is possible to control for possible trend 
differences in the econometric specification by introducing separate time trends 
for the groups. This further strengthens the identification strategy. 
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Figure 5 Mean savings amount and 95% confidence intervals in the 
treatment and control groups from 2000 to 2007 
 
 
As mentioned above, the actual reform was announced already in 2004 and this 
enabled individuals to anticipate the reform in 2004. Also, the mixed system in 
2005 causes problems for the identification. Figure 5 reveals that there might 
have been some anticipation before the reform, at least in 2004 in the high-
income treatment group . Thus, to figure out the effect of the reform, the results 
are presented using the years from 2000 to 2003 as a before period and the years 
2006 and 2007 as an after period. 
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4. Econometric results 
The dependent variables are the dummy variable with a value of one if the 
individual has saved in VPPs and zero otherwise, and the logarithm of the annual 
amount of VPP savings for an individual. The main control variables are age, 
labor income, capital income, debts and tax payments. The control vector 
including gender, residence area, education and marital status is also added to the 
specification as a dummy when a method other than fixed effects is used. In 
addition, all the specifications include flexible time trends. The most interesting 
coefficient is the interaction term of the after-dummy and treatment variables. 
Changes in behavior in the treatment groups due to the reform are detected if 
these interaction terms produce a statistically significant coefficient. 
As mentioned in the descriptive analysis section, only a relatively small fraction 
of individuals save in VPPs in Finland, thus there are many observations with a 
value of zero VPP savings in the data set. Therefore, when the analysis concerns 
the savings amount, the dependent variable is a combination of discrete and 
continuous distributions. In this case, it would be difficult to find a very credible 
estimator if only cross-section data were available. However, the ability to use 
panel data methods eases this difficulty. In line with Angrist (2001), the starting 
point is simply to use a fixed-effect OLS model to estimate changes in both 
coverage and the savings amount of treated individuals. There are at least two 
major benefits in using this method: first, the calculation of the average treatment 
effects or standard errors is not computationally demanding and second, the 
interpretation of the results is easy. However, I also estimate the coverage 
changes using a probit model to compare them to the base case result of the 
fixed-effect model.18  
Table 2 presents the fixed-effect OLS and probit19 results of the participation 
effects in both the high and low labor income treatment groups.20 The results 
imply that the coverage of VPP savers decreased in the high income treatment 
group and increased in the low income treatment group. The results indicate that 
high-income earners decreased their participation by approximately 4 percentage 
points. Among low-income earners, coverage increased from 1 to 2 percentage 
points because of the reform. However, the change in participation is not 
statistically very clear because the changes are significant only at the 10 per cent 
level. 
 
                                              
18 This part of the analysis is similar to the analysis of Disney et al. (2010).  
19 The marginal effects of the interaction terms are calculated as Blundell et al. (2004) proposed. 
20 The results of the fixed-effect models with all the control variable coefficients are presented in the 
Appendix, Table 2. 
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Table 2 Results for the participation estimation 
High income = Treat Low income = Treat 
Variable Fixed effect Probit Fixed effect Probit 
After*Treat -.034*** -.046*** .012* .022** 
  (.012) (.015) (.007) (.008) 
Treat  .062***  -.032*** 
   (.009)  (.002) 
N 31 790 31 790 197 357 197 357 
R2 0.047 0.062 0.046 0.144 
Log likelihood -14458.4  -49135.3 
 
Note: The table reports the effects of the reform on the probability of saving in voluntary pension saving plans. All the 
estimates are marginal effects of the reform. All the models are estimated with a full set of control variables and 
controlling for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals. The personal-level controls are capital income, age, 
age square, debts, and in the probit models residence area, gender, education, marital status and residence type were 
added as dummy variables. 
The robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3 Results for the log of savings21 
High income = Treat Low income = Treat 
Variable Random effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect 
After*Treat -.255*** -.242*** .132* .035 
  (.088) (.092) (.070) (.076) 
Treat .533***  -.365***   
  (.093)  (.044)   
N 6 273 6 273 16 205 16 205 
R2 0.120 0.046 0.112 0.043 
 
Note: The table reports the effects of the reform on the log of the savings amount in voluntary pension saving plans. 
The estimation is made using panel methods, random and fixed-effect models. Both models are estimated with a full 
set of control variables and controlling for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals. The personal-level 
controls are capital income, age, age square, debts, labor income and tax payments, and in the random effect model 
residence area, gender, education, marital status and residence type were added as dummy variables.  
The robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the changes in the log of savings amounts among 
the treated groups due to the reform. In the high-income treatment the savings 
amount declined on average by 24 per cent. This can be seen as a relatively 
significant change. However, the estimate of the low-income treatment group is 
                                              
21 The Hausman test suggests that the fixed-effect model should be used instead of random effects 
because, for instance, in the high-income treatment case the null hypothesis of firm-specific effects 
uncorrelated with the regressors is rejected at the level of 494.89 (chi 2(5)). However, the coefficient of 
interest is not very sensitive to the model. Also, including municipality-level controls in the model does 
not affect the main results. These results are available upon request. 
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not statistically significant and the estimate value is financially minor - a change 
of only approximately 3 per cent on average.22 
As a robustness check, the division into control and treatment groups is also 
performed by using taxable labor income and MTR schedules for 2002. 
Otherwise the groups are formed similarly, as presented in Section III.1. The 
results are not statistically different from the base case results, see Appendix, 
Table 7. This gives support to the base case estimates and further strengthens the 
conclusion that the reform affected individuals’ saving decisions.23 
Another way to test the robustness of the results is to check the existence of 
trends before the reform with a placebo intervention. I assume now that the 
reform was implemented in 2002 and use the years 2000 and 2001 as a pre-
reform period and 2002 and 2003 as post-years. When low income treatment 
coverage is compared to the control group, the trend seems to be slightly 
different between groups, but after introducing a linear time trend for low income 
treatment the difference vanishes. The results are not statistically significantly 
different from zero between the groups in any other comparisons with coverage 
or the amount of savings. This test offers further support to my identification 
strategy. 
The transitional provisions and the anticipation of the reform can have an effect 
on the results for the years 2004 and 2005; the results may be biased because of 
these reasons. If there was anticipation the base case results would be downward-
biased. Both anticipation and transitional provisions need to be considered. One 
possible way to overcome the problem is to delete the years 2004 and 2005 from 
the data set. Then, 2000-2003 are used as a pre-reform period and 2006-2007 are 
used as a post-reform period. The results of the estimations are presented in the 
Appendix, Table 8 and 9. According to these results the estimates are larger than 
in the base case. However, the estimates are not statistically different from the 
base case results, and thus the anticipation effect is not very clear. 
More comprehensive analysis of anticipation suggests no changes before the 
reform: neither of the treatment groups changed behavior in 2004 or 2005 in a 
statistically significant way. The results imply that there was no statistically or 
economically significant difference in the behavior of individuals in these years. 
                                              
22 The estimation is also performed using regression discontinuity design (RDD) for the high-income 
treatment group. The RDD result is approximately a 17 per cent decrease in the savings of high-income 
treated individuals, which is not statistically different from the base case result of a 24 per cent decrease. 
These results are available upon request. 
23 Mean labor income for 2000-2003 was also used for formulating the treatment and control groups. The 
estimates are not statistically different from the base case results. These and the results arrived at using 
2002 labor income are available upon request. 
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Thus, the base case results seem to offer robust estimates of the reform on the 
behavior of low and high- income earners.24 
According to the METRs, the hypothesis is that older individuals had a greater 
incentive to change their behavior even more than other individuals in the 
treatment group. The triple difference model with a fixed-effect strategy 
estimated according to equation (4) does not offer statistically significant 
estimates of interest where people over 50 years old in 2003 were multiplied with 
the high-income treatment group. Thus, we can conclude that savings coverage 
did not change differently among older treated individuals due to the reform25. 
One possible explanation is that older people are not well informed (or are not 
interested) in their pensions and incentives to save. This has been observed 
previously in the empirical literature26. The results from the estimations are 
parallel with this conclusion. Another explanation for the results could be that 
older people’s contributions to VPPs have a larger discounted value than those of 
younger people and they do not change their behavior even though the tax 
incentive to save in VPPs decreased after the reform. 
A further examination of responses by gender reveals that only males reacted to 
the reform. The two first columns in Table 4 represent the results for the divided 
sample by gender. The results indicate that the total response comes solely from 
the male treated group. Thus high-income males are less likely to be VPP savers 
after the reform than before, and also the savings of high-income males are much 
lower because of the reform. Moreover, the result implies that savings behavior 
did not change among high-income females at all. All the responses come from 
men’s changed behavior in the high-income treatment group. It is also noticeable 
that the estimates for females’ participation and savings amount are positive, 
which would imply increased savings. Nevertheless, these estimates are not 
statistically different from zero. 
The third and fourth column in Table 4 contains the estimates for the low-income 
treatment group by gender. The effects of the reform for the low-income 
treatment group offer similar results: coverage changed statistically significantly 
only among males. The estimates imply that only males responded to the reform 
in the low-income treatment group by being more active in saving in VPPs. As 
can be expected from the base case results, the amount of savings did not change, 
either for males or females.  
                                              
24 As told before, the reform reduced the upper limit of tax deductions from 8,500 euro to 5,000 euro. 
This could, for example, solely explain the reduction in high-income earners voluntary pension savings. 
However, I have done a robustness check by substituting all observations higher than 5,000 euro VPP 
savings before the reform by 5,000 euro, and the estimates are not statistically different from the base 
case results. 
25 These results are presented in the Appendix, Table 10. 
26 See example.g. Lusardi (2008). 
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The results suggest that high-income savers seemed to change their behavior 
actively because of the reform by both lowering their saving activity and 
lowering the amount of savings. On the other hand, the results imply that low-
income individuals increased their activity to save in VPPs but did not change the 
amount of savings. It also seems clear that gender is important role for the 
responses; all of the changed behavior is made by males and females did not 
change their behavior at all. These results support the view that males respond 
more actively to changes in saving incentives. 
However, there are additional caveats which should be emphasized. The effects 
of added marketing of voluntary pension plans and the effect of the reform of 
earning-related pensions cannot be fully controlled in the estimations. It is also 
possible that the reform of earnings-related pensions has indeed changed younger 
VPP savers’ behavior but it has hardly changed savings in different income 
groups. These effects cannot be ignored and might cause bias in the observed 
results.  
Table 4 The differences in responses between male and female treated 
individuals: changes in participation and savings amount  
 High-income treatment Low-income treatment 
            Participation  Savings  Participation  Savings   
Variable Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
After*Treat -.033** .019 -.265** .076 .010* .003 -.074 .043 
 (.017) (.042) (.106) (.169) (.006) (.014) (.093) (.121) 
N 25,718     7,726 4,564         1,709 88,569     99,845 7,349       8,856 
R2 0.047       0.059 0.067         0.143 0.041       0.053 0.224       -0.161 
Note: The table reports the effects of the reform on the probability of saving and the amount of savings in voluntary 
pension saving plans. The estimation is made using fixed-effects OLS. All the estimates are marginal effects of the 
reform. All the models are estimated with a full set of control variables and controlling for separate linear time trends 
for treatment individuals. The personal-level controls are capital income, age, age square, debts, labor income and tax 
payments. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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5. Conclusion 
The Nordic-type dual income taxation offers two alternatives for taxing VPPs. 
The first option is the progressive labor income taxation and the second is to 
apply the proportional capital income taxation. In 2005 the taxation of VPP 
instruments changed from labor income to capital income taxation in Finland. 
The reform changed the tax incentives to save in VPPs differently in different 
subgroups.  
The empirical analysis of this reform was conducted by using micro data and 
econometric methods in a before-after framework. Before the reform, high 
income individuals had a clear tax incentive to save in VPPs but the reform 
abolished these incentives. In addition, the reform increased the incentives of 
low-income individuals to save in VPPs. Therefore, subpopulations faced the tax 
change differently and it is reasonable to examine the effects of this reform on 
savers’ behavior by using a difference-in-difference strategy.  
The results imply both economically and statistically significant estimates. 
Firstly, the results imply that high labor income savers lowered their savings 
amounts and the coverage in VPPs. The probability to save in voluntary pensions 
declined by approximately 4 percentage points and savings decreased by 24 per 
cent on average, among high earners. Low income earners’ probability to save 
increased from 1 to 2 percentage points but their savings amounts did not change. 
Gender seems to have a remarkable role in explaining the responses since the 
results indicate that only males changed their behavior. 
With the proportion of working-age populations declining, governments are 
facing huge budgetary pressure, especially in countries such as Finland, where 
pensions are mostly government-funded. The results of this analysis show that 
tax incentives have an influence on private pension savings although the 
responses are heterogeneous.  
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6. Appendix 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics, data from 2000 to 2007  
Variable Mean SD N Min Max 
VPP savings coverage 0.067 0.249 424304 0 1 
VPP savings 97.3 576.1 424304 0 14780.3 
Labor income 14827.2 15539.0 424304 0 1014499 
Debts 10664.9 30860.7 424304 0 4412886 
Capital income 1034.2 13455.9 424304 0 4652870 
Home ownership 0.333 0.471 424304 0 1 
Taxes 4245.3 7770.3 424304 0 1334057 
Male 0.417 0.493 424304 0 1 
Age 38.9 22.3 424304 0 103 
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Table 6 Fixed-effect results with full set of control variables 
  High-income treatment Low-income treatment 
VARIABLES Savings Coverage Savings Coverage 
Labor income♦ -0.005 0.002 0.007** 0.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Debts♦ -0.002* -0.001* -0.008 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) 
Capital income♦ 0.001** 0.001 -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Tax payments 0.051 0.014** -0.019 -0.006*** 
 (0.045) (0.007) (0.026) (0.002) 
Age 0.331*** 0.075*** 0.302*** 0.037*** 
 (0.051) (0.005) (0.029) (0.001) 
Age square -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year 2001 0.042 -0.002 0.035 -0.000 
 (0.040) (0.003) (0.040) (0.003) 
Year 2002 -0.052 0.021*** -0.066 0.024*** 
 (0.044) (0.004) (0.044) (0.004) 
Year 2003 0.038 0.037*** 0.021 0.040*** 
 (0.038) (0.004) (0.037) (0.004) 
Year 2004 0.138*** 0.030*** 0.113*** 0.032*** 
 (0.043) (0.004) (0.043) (0.004) 
Year 2005 0.139*** 0.027*** 0.062* 0.023*** 
 (0.035) (0.004) (0.033) (0.004) 
Year 2006 -0.015 -0.000 -0.049*** -0.002 
 (0.024) (0.003) (0.017) (0.001) 
Year 2007 -0.017 0.000 -0.055* -0.001 
 (0.024) (0.002) (0.038) (0.004) 
Treat*After -0.242*** -0.034*** 0.035 0.012* 
 (0.092) (0.012) (0.076) (0.007) 
Observations 6,273 33,444 16,205 188,414 
R-squared 0.046 0.047 0.043 0.047 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
♦In thousands of euros 
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Table 7 Results for participation and savings as groups defined by 2002 
data 
               High income = Treat Low income = Treat 
Variable Participation Savings Participation Savings 
After*Treat -0.045*** -0.242** 0.018** 0.143* 
  (0.019) (0.116) (0.007) (0.080) 
N 31,790 6,009 197,357 16,784 
R2 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.043 
 
Note: The table reports the effects of the reform on the probability of saving in voluntary pension saving plans. The 
estimation is made using a fixed-effect method. All the estimates are marginal effects of the reform. All the models 
are estimated with a full set of control variables and controlling for separate linear time trends for treatment 
individuals. The personal-level controls are capital income, age, age square, debts, labor income and tax payments.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 8 Results for the participation estimation 
                        High income = Treat Low income = Treat 
Variable  Fixed effect   Fixed effect  
After*Treat  -.056***   .025***  
   (.014)   (.005)  
N  25 605   144 256  
R2  0.050   0.056  
 
Note: The table reports the effects of the reform on the probability of saving in voluntary pension saving plans. All 
the estimates are marginal effects of the reform. All the models are estimated with a full set of control variables and 
controlling for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals. The personal-level controls are capital income, 
age, age square, debts, labor income and tax payments, and in the probit models residence area, gender, 
education, marital status and residence type were added as dummy variables. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 9 Results for the log of savings 
                         High income = Treat Low income = Treat 
Variable Random effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect 
After*Treat -.393*** -.355*** .158*** .096* 
  (.088) (.093) (.035) (.049) 
N 4 561 4 561 11 829 11 829 
R2 0.234 0.121 0.268 0.211 
 
Note: The table reports the effects of the reform on the log of the amount of savings in voluntary pension savings 
plans. The estimation is made using panel methods using random and fixed-effects models. All the models are 
estimated with a full set of control variables and controlling for separate linear time trends for treatment individuals. 
The personal-level controls are capital income, age, age square, debts, labor income and tax payments, and in the 
random effect model residence area, gender, education, marital status and residence type were added as dummy 
variables.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10 Triple-difference model for high income and treated individuals 
over 50 years old: changes in participation and amount  
Participation Savings  
Variable FE OLS  FE OLS  
DDD -.005 (.024) -.068 (.203) 
DD -.031** (.014) -.202*** (.051) 
Age*After -.042*** (.010) -.181* (.110) 
N 34,088  34,088  
R2 0.049  0.137  
Note: The table reports the effects of the reform on the probability of saving and the amount of savings in voluntary 
pension saving plans. The estimation is made using fixed-effects OLS. All the estimates are marginal effects of the 
reform. Both models are estimated with a full set of control variables and controlling for separate linear time trends 
for treatment individuals. The personal-level controls are capital income, age, age square, debts, labor income and 
tax payments. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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